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Firm Size and Wages in Italy:  
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We use longitudinal data based on administrative archives from 1985 to 2002 to estimate the 
relationship between wages and firm size for Italy. Controlling for individual fixed effects we find 
that  larger  firms  pay  significantly  higher  wages,  although  the  individual  unmeasured  ability 
component accounts for about one half of the uncovered size-wage premium. To reduce potential 
self-selection problems arising from endogenous job changes, we focus on a sample of workers 
displaced by plant closings. Using this sample, we confirm that larger firms pay higher wages in 
part for unmeasured workers’ abilities and in part for true size effects. 
 
JEL classification: J41; M51; J45.  
 




The positive relationship existing between firm size and wages is by now well documented in the 
empirical literature: workers with the same observable characteristics are paid a wage significantly 
higher in larger firms (see, among others, Brown and Medoff, 1989; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 
1999; Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, 1999; Manning, 2003). For example, in their seminal paper, Brown 
and  Medoff  (1989)  find  that  in  the  US  an  employee  in  a  large  firm  (that  is,  with  500  or  more 
employees)  gains  35%  percent  more  than  an  employee  with  the  same  observable  characteristics 
employed in a small firm. The large employer wage premium is similar in magnitude to the race or 
gender wage premium. 
However, there is no consensus in the literature on the source of the observed wage premium 
for  large  firms.  The  main  controversy  hinges  upon  whether  the  large  firm  premium  is  due  to 
unobserved workers’ productive abilities (for observationally equivalent workers) or whether it is due 
to some employer’s characteristics. As Gibson and Stillman (2009) puts it “in light of the conflicting 
views on the worker quality explanation, more evidence is needed”. 
The economic theory has offered a variety of explanations for the large firm wage premium: 
1)  compensations  for  higher  workers’  skills;  2)  “compensating  wages”  probably  because  of  less 
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attractive working conditions in large firms; 3) rent sharing, since large firms have typically higher 
monopoly  power  and,  consequently,  higher  profits  that  firms  may  share  with  their  workers );  4) 
“efficiency wages” considerations, monitoring being more difficult and shirking presumably  more 
costly in larger firms.  
Understanding  the  source  of  the  wage  premium  is  also  relevant  because  the  explanations 
related  to  the  unobserved  workers’  abilities  and  to  the  compensating  wage  differentials  may  be 
reconciled with competitive models of labor markets, while the other factors are in contrast to them. 
The  issue  of  whether  workers’  unobserved  traits  are  responsible  for  firm  size  wage 
differentials is strictly related to the use of econometric estimators that allow to identify a causal effect 
of firm size. The use of an OLS estimator with cross-sectional data clearly leads to an upward bias if 
unobservable  abilities  are  positively  correlated  to  firm  size.  Two  alternative  methods  have  been 
undertaken to avoid estimation biases: the adoption of a selection model explaining the sorting of 
workers across employers of different sizes and the use of fixed effects estimators with longitudinal 
data. Neither of these two methods is immune from problems. 
Idson and Feaster (1990) for US, Main and Reilly (1993) for UK, and Brunello and Colussi 
(1998) for Italy estimate with cross-sectional data the size-wage effect with a two-step procedure: first, 
they take into account the non-random sorting of workers across different-size employers, estimating a 
selection equation to predict the distribution of employees in different firm size categories, and then 
add  the  selection  term  into  the  wage  equation  (Heckman,  1976;  Lee,  1978). This  procedure  is  a 
substitute for an instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy (with an instrument for firm size) that 
the  authors  are  forced  to  follow  since  in  their  data  firm  size  is  a  categorical  variable  making 
unpractical the use of an IV estimator. 
Correcting  for  the  potential  selection  bias  –  using  typically  marital  status  and  number  of 
children as identifying variables for firm size – Idson and Feaster (1990) and Main and Reilly (1993) 
find a considerable wage premium for large firms, while Brunello and Colussi (1998) find no wage 
premium for Italian workers once the observed characteristics and selection effects have been taken 
into account. 
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) study the Swiss labor market focusing on job changers 
and controlling for sample selectivity to attenuate the endogeneity problem. They find that about one-
half of the large firm wage premium is due to worker heterogeneity.  
Albæk  et al. (1998), thanks to the availability of a continuous measure of firm size, are able to 
use a more standard IV strategy. Their TSLS estimates find that selection effects are little relevant but 
their over-identification tests reject the validity of the instruments. They are in general skeptical on the 
possibility  of  obtaining  exogenous  and  relevant  instruments  for  firm  size  to  deal  with  potential 
selection effects. 
The alternative estimation strategy followed to avoid self-selection problems consists in the 
use of a fixed effects estimator with panel data. Brown and Medoff (1989) using longitudinal data find   3 
that firm size wage differentials are partially  due to the presence of higher quality workers in large 
firms: the size wage differentials are reduced by 5-45 percent when using individual fixed effects. On 
the other hand,  Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)  using a large matched  employer-employee 
dataset from France find that individual heterogeneity  accounts for almost all the wage variations 
between size categories, while firm heterogeneity contributes for a negligible fraction. 
However, as argued by Solon (1988) and Gibbons and Katz (1992), fixed effects estimates are 
based on the assumption that job changes are exogenous. In contrast, if workers’ decisions to move is 
voluntary, there could be a self-selection problem and fixed effects estimates are inconsistent. 
Finally, a number of empirical works use matched employer-employee data set (Troske, 1999; 
Albæk  et al., 1998; Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991; Arai, 2003, Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx, 
2007; Pedace 2010) trying to explain the firm size wage differential putting it in relation with a 
number of employers’ characteristics: physical capital intensity (to test if skill-capital complementarity 
is  relevant),  profits  (for  the  rent  sharing  hypothesis),  working  conditions  (to  verify  if  firms  pay 
compensating wage differentials),  monitoring (testing efficiency wages theories), workforce skills, 
unionization  and  so  on.  Typically,  these  studies  find  that  physical  capital,  profits  and  skill 
complementarity  are  important  determinants  of  wage  differentials,  although  a  large  part  of  the 
differentials remains unexplained.
1 
The aim of this paper is to estimate for Italian workers  the magnitude of the employer-size 
wage effect  using panel data. T o further investigate the extent of self-selection problems in fixed 
effects estimates we use a sub-sample of workers displaced by plant closings. We follow the approach 
of Gibbons and Katz (1992) that in their analysis of inter -industry wage differentials propose the 
selection of a sample of workers displaced by  the closure of their firm.  The focus on exogenous 
movers should reduce the incidence of self-selection bias. 
We use  two  large datasets  based on Social Security administrative records  –  the  Work 
Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) and the dataset “Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti” (FRDB) – with 
more than 700,000 observations with information on workers’ and employers’ characteristics (wage, 
gender, age, occupation, seniority, geographical area, size, industry, etc.). While WHIP is a long panel 
(workers are followed for 18 years), the advantage of FRDB dataset is the information on the firm 
status (if the firm is active or has been closed). 
Controlling  for  individual  fixed  effects  we  find  that  larger  firms  pay  significantly  higher 
wages,  although  the  individual  unmeasured  ability  component  accounts  for  about  one-half  of  the 
uncovered size-wage premium: a firm with 1,000 or more employees pays a wage 13% higher in 
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individual fixed effects estimates, while we find a 27% higher wages in estimates controlling for 
individual characteristics. 
When we use the sample of workers displaced by plant closings, we find wage premiums paid 
by large firms  similar in magnitude to those estimated with fixed effects on the whole sample , 
confirming that larger firms pay higher wages in part for unmeasured workers’ abilities and in part for 
true size effects. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the datasets used and some descriptive 
statistics. In Section 3 we carry out the empirical analysis with fixed effects estimates. Section 4 is 
devoted to estimate firm size effects exploiting exogenous job changes. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Data 
The dataset used for our empirical analysis is the public-use version of Work Histories Italian Panel 
(WHIP), provided by LABORatorio Revelli (Turin) and drawn from administrative records of the 
National Institute of Social Security (INPS).
2 WHIP is a panel of private firms employees
3 followed 
for the years from 1985 to  2004, a 1:180 random sample of the universe of employees constituting 
more than 1,000,000 observations (about 60,000 individuals per year). WHIP reports information on 
worker’s age, gender, professional qualification, gross annual wage, start and end dates of each job, 
geographical area of work, number of yearly work days, firm size categories (1–9 employees; 10–19; 
20–199; 200–999; 1000 or more), sector of activity, etc. Unfortunately, no information on educational 
attainment is available in the dataset. 
We  focus  on  employees  between  16  and  64  years  old,  blue  and  white-collars  (excluding 
apprentices and managers). Employees working in a year for less than 3 months (corresponding for 
administrative reasons to 78 workdays) are excluded. In addition, we exclude from our sample part-
time employees, employees on maternity leave, on redundancy pay (CIG), and eliminate observations 
with missing values on firm size, employment qualification, geographical location, industry.
4  
We do not observe hours of work but we observe full time equivalent days  for each year and 
we calculate the daily wage by dividing the yearly wages by the number of workdays.  Wages are 
deflated using the ISTAT consumer price index (at 2000 prices).  To avoid outliers, we also eliminate 
observations with  daily wages below the 0.1 percentile (€  11.5) and above the 99.9 percentile (€ 
257.7). We build Tenure of workers for each year as the difference between the end of the year and the 
date of hiring in the current firm.
5 Experience represents the time from the date of entry in the labor 
market and the current period and it is calculated similarly to Tenure.
6 
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5 Alternatively, between the date of firing and the date of hiring if job match is destroyed during the year. 
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We end up with a sample of 746,437 observations regarding 103,772 individuals. 
The second dataset we use – elaborated by the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (FRDB)
7 – is 
very similar to the WHIP dataset. These data have been produced from the same administrative source 
(INPS).  The  relevant  difference  is  that  in  the  FRDB  over  the  years  1997-2002  is  available  the 
information on the firm status, reporting if the firm is active or has been closed.
8 We exploit this 
information to build a sample of workers displaced because of plant closure s. Job changes in this 
sample should be less affected by endogeneity problems (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). 
In Table 1 we show descriptive statistics  referring to the WHIP dataset , separating worker 
characteristics by firm size categories. 28.5% are females, the average age is 36.4. Blue collars are 
64%. About 61% are from Northern regions, while 20% are from the South. Manufacturing workers 
are 51%, Commerce 15%, Financial intermediation 11%, Transport and communication 7% (not 
reported). 
About 25% are employed in firms with 1-9 employees, 13% in firms with 10-19 employees; 
31% are in firms with 20-199 employees, 14% in firms 200-999 employees and 17% are in firms with 
more than 1,000 employees. From Table 1 we see that wages strongly increase with firm size. Females 
work mainly in small firms. Workers are older and have higher experience and tenure in larger firms. 
Blue-collars are mainly concentrated in small firms. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Breakdown by Firm Size. 
  Firm Size Categories  All firms 
  1-9  10-19  20-199  200-999  >=1000   
Wage (daily)  52.819  56.907  63.530  74.347  86.102  65.437 
Female  0.337  0.325  0.291  0.255  0.197  0.285 
Age  33.601  34.678  36.325  38.358  40.342  36.416 
Tenure   3.848  4.415  5.319  7.022  9.571  5.813 
Experience   6.945  7.542  8.217  9.123  10.684  8.369 
Blue-collar  0.706  0.736  0.690  0.587  0.440  0.643 
White-collar  0.294  0.264  0.310  0.413  0.560  0.357 
North  0.548  0.601  0.653  0.672  0.574  0.609 
Center  0.201  0.199  0.178  0.174  0.219  0.193 
South  0.251  0.200  0.169  0.155  0.208  0.198 
Observations  183,512  99,330  231,199  101,952  130,444  746,437 
Notes: WHIP dataset. Years=1985-2002. 
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3. Firm Size Effects on Wages 
To evaluate the firm size effect on wages, we estimate by OLS the following model: 
    it t i it it
k




ln                                [1] 
where  it W  represents the (daily) wage level of worker i in year t (t=1985..2002);  it k Size ) (  (k=2..5) are 
four  dummies  for  the  firm  size  categories  described  above  (the  size  class  with  1-9  employees 
represents the reference category);  it X  is a vector of time-variant individual characteristics;  it F  is a 
vector of firm characteristics such as geographical location (5 categories) and industry (10 categories); 
i   are individual fixed effects;  t   are year dummies;  it   is an error term capturing idiosyncratic 
shocks or unobserved worker characteristics.  
In all the estimates we run, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted 
for clustering at the individual level.  
Firstly, we run a simple OLS regression of (log) wages on 4 dummies for firm -size classes 
without controls (column 1, Table 2). In column (2) we control for gender, age, tenure, tenure squared, 
experience,  experience  squared,  professional  qualifications,  industrial  sectors,  regions,  yearly 
dummies (column 2, Table 2). Results show that, controlling for individual characteristics, there is a 
huge effect of firm size: with respect to the reference category, a firm with 20-199 employees pays a 
wage 11% higher, a firm with 200-999 employees pays 20% more and a firm with more than 1,000 
employees pays a wage higher of 27%.
9 By comparing firm size effects in specifications (1) (without 
controls) and (2) it emerges that a considerable share of the large size firm premium can be attributed 
to workers’ observable characteristics.  
In column (3) of Table 2 we estimate the wage regression using individual fixed effects to 
remove the impact of employee-specific time invariant factors. Firm size effects are still positive and 
highly  significant  but  their  magnitude  is  reduced  by  about  half.  For  example,  a  firm  with  200 
employees pays nearly 10% more, while a firm with more than 1,000 employees pays higher wages of 
about 13.4%.  
A typical and well-known problem with fixed effects estimates is that measurement errors are 
exacerbated  and  these  could  bias  downward  the  estimates.  However,  since  our  data  come  from 
administrative sources, they are relatively less affected by measurement errors with respect to other 
analyses based on surveys of workers or employers. 
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in a firm with 250 employees or more gain a wage 51% higher than employees in the smallest firms (with less 
than 10 employees). Controlling  for individual characteristics, the effect is around 30% (see Manning, 2003, p. 
85).   7 
Our findings imply that individual unobserved  abilities are able to explain a sizable share 
(about 50%) of the firm size effect in OLS estimates, while about one half can be attributed to firm 
characteristics. 
 
Table 2. The Impact of Firm Size on Wages. OLS estimates. Dependent Variable:    Wage ln  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Firm Size 10-19  0.0631***  0.0559***  0.0276*** 
  (0.0022)  (0.0019)  (0.0015) 
Firm Size 20-199  0.1546***  0.1100***  0.0579*** 
  (0.0022)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Firm Size 200-999  0.3094***  0.2011***  0.0966*** 
  (0.0031)  (0.0026)  (0.0027) 
Firm Size >=1000  0.4684***  0.2698***  0.1340*** 
  (0.0028)  (0.0027)  (0.0032) 
Female    -0.2009***   
    (0.0018)   
Age    0.0043***  0.0210*** 
    (0.0001)  (0.0008) 
Tenure    0.0110***  0.0072*** 
    (0.0005)  (0.0003) 
Tenure Squared    -0.0003***  -0.0000 
    (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Experience    0.0106***  -0.0012 
    (0.0005)  (0.0009) 
Experience Squared    -0.0001***  -0.0004*** 
    (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Blue Collar    -0.2905***  -0.0945*** 
    (0.0021)  (0.0027) 
North-East    -0.0181***  -0.0029 
    (0.0020)  (0.0065) 
Centre    -0.0283***  -0.0075 
    (0.0023)  (0.0068) 
South    -0.0478***  -0.0126* 
    (0.0025)  (0.0073) 
Islands    -0.0579***  -0.0166 
     (0.0038)  (0.0102) 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES 
Observations  746437  746437  746437 
R-squared  0.2101  0.4697  0.2093 
Number of Individuals      103772 
Notes: The Table reports OLS estimates. In all the regressions we control for 18 year dummies and 10 industry dummies (not 
reported). Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the individual level, are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level. Source: WHIP data. 
 
In order to obtain a summary measure of the effect of firm size on wages, that is, the firm size-
wage elasticity, following a common practice we impute to each  firm size category a continuous 
measure of size, Firm Size, using the midpoint of the size classes
10 (see Manning, 2003; Brown and 
Medoff, 1989). Albæk  et al. (1998) confirm that this practice has negligible consequences in terms of 
measurement errors. 
                                                       
10 Firms in the largest class are attributed the double of the category’s threshold.   8 
We regress the (log) wage on the logarithm of Firm Size. Therefore, the coefficient represents 
the elasticity of wage with respect to the firm size. Estimates of the same specifications in Table 2 are 
reported in Table 3. An employee moving to a firm with a double size increases his wage of about 
4.3%, controlling for individual characteristics (column 2). Using individual fixed effects (column 3), 
the increase in wage is 2.0%. 
 
Table 3. The Elasticity of Wages to Firm Size. Firm Size measured continuously. OLS estimates. 
Dependent Variable:    Wage ln  
  (1) 
 
(2)  (3) 
Log (Firm Size)  0.0738***  0.0429***  0.0205*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0005) 
       
Controls  NO  YES  YES 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES 
       
Observations  746437  746437  746437 
R-squared  0.1992  0.26044  0.2089 
Number of Individuals      103772 
Notes: see Table 2. 
 
Results are in line with those obtained in other countries. Brown and Medoff (1989) estimate 
an  elasticity  ranging  from  2.1  to  3.2.  Manning  (2003)  shows  that  the  elasticity  for  US  is  6.4% 
controlling for individual characteristics, while the same author finds an elasticity of 1.3% for UK 
using individual fixed effects. Albæk  et al. (1998), using cross-section data for Nordic countries, find 
that controlling for many individual and employer characteristics, the firm size wage elasticity ranges 
between 2 and 3 percent. 
Both in Table 2 and 3 it clearly emerges that the estimated size-wage differential is reduced by 
about 50 percent when using individual fixed effects. However, the component imputable to firm 
characteristics remains quite considerable. 
The  differences  between  cross-sectional  and  fixed  effects  estimates  are  in  line  with  the 
findings of Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) for Switzerland, while we find a higher percentage 
attributable to firm characteristics with respect to Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) who argue 
that individual heterogeneity effects explain about 75% of the firm-size wage effect, while firm effects 
explain relatively little. 
 
Distinguishing the Effect on Movers from Firm Size Variations 
The effect of firm size on wages in estimates of Tables 2 and 3 is identified by two distinct variations: 
1) growth or contraction of the size of a firm over time (employees do not change firms); 2) workers 
moving from one firm to another of different size. In this section we investigate if these two types of 
variations  produce  similar  effects  on  wages  (Brown  and  Medoff,  1989;  Winter-Ebmer  and 
Zweimüller, 1999).    9 
To identify the first effect,  that is, the  change in size of the same firm , instead of using 
employee fixed effects, we use fixed effects for each specific job match between a given firm and a 
given worker. Estimates are reported in Table 4, column 1: in this regression, the firm-size effect is 
identified only by changes in the size of the same firm. The firm size elasticity is estimated at 1.15 
percent (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). 
Alternatively, to estimate the impact on wages of firms changing their size,  we focus on a 
sample of “stayers” (workers who never changed their firm).  Almost half of the sample workers 
(341,445) did not change their firm in the period under examination. On this sample, we estimate the 
effects of firm size with employee fixed effects. In this case, the firm size elasticity is estimated at 
about 1.24% (Table 4, column 2).The results of the two procedures are very similar. 
The estimate of the impact on wages of firm size variations should be less affected by self-
selection  bias,  since  the  change  in  size  is  typically  not  affected  by  worker  individual  decisions 
(exogenous variation). On the other hand, the estimated effect on workers who do not change firm 
could be affected by the existence of some inertia in a firm’s contractual structure. 
In order to identify the effect of firm size when a worker moves between firms of different 
size,  we  build  a  sample  by  excluding  all  the  firms  that  have  changed  their  size  over  the  period 
considered.  Then,  we  estimate  on  this  sample  with  employee  fixed  effects  (Table  4,  column  3). 
Alternatively, we exclude from our sample all the stayers (as defined above) and estimate only on 
workers moving at least once (Table 4, column 4). The two procedures lead to very similar results: the 
effect of the firm size for workers moving between firms is considerable higher: the elasticity is 2.1-
2.3%, again significant at the 1 percent level. 
In the next Section we directly address the problem of endogenous job changes, that could bias 
even fixed effects estimates. 
 
Table 4. The Elasticity of Wages to Firm Size Distinguishing between Stayers and Movers. Dependent 
Variable:    Wage ln  







Log (Firm Size)  0.0115***  0.0124***  0.0230***  0.0207*** 
  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)    
         
Controls  YES  YES  YES  YES 
  Fixed effects for 







Sample    Only Stayers  Excluding firms 
that changed their 
size 
Only Movers 
Observations  746437  341445  547324  404992    
R-squared  0.239  0.274  0.196  0.191    
Number of individuals    58768  92648  45004 
Notes: The Table reports OLS estimates. In all the regressions we control for 18 year dummies and 10 industry dummies (not 
reported). Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the individual level, are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level. Source: WHIP data. 
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4. Firm Size Effects Exploiting Exogenous Job Changes 
Fixed effects estimates identify the impact of firm size on the basis of wages paid to workers moving 
from employers of different size. The implicit assumption is that job changes are exogenous.  
Since many job changes are voluntary, one may question that the endogeneity of job changes 
leads to inconsistent estimators even using individual fixed effects (Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Solon, 
1988).  Gibbons  and  Katz  (1992)  propose  a  simple  theoretical  model  showing  that  under  the 
assumptions that unmeasured abilities could not be equally valued in firms of different categories and 
that information about individual abilities is imperfect initially but improves over time, workers could 
move from one type of firm to another generating variations in wages that mimic true firm effects 
even if there is only heterogeneity among individuals and no firm effects. 
In this section we try to face this problem following the empirical approach that Gibbons and 
Katz (1992) have adopted to estimate inter-industry wage differentials. 
We  use  the  INPS  administrative  data  provided  by  the  Fondazione  Rodolfo  Debenedetti 
(FRDB). The data are very similar to the WHIP dataset but for our purposes we can only use the 
sample 1997-2002 because the information on firm status (active, suspended,
11 closed) is available 
only for these years. A further difference with the WHIP dataset is that firm size is a continuous 
measure. 
We  follow  the  same  criteria  explained  in  Section  2  to  select  our  sample  of  workers. 
Preliminarily, to verify that  the WHIP and FRDB datasets are consistent, we replicate  on the whole 
sample  of FRDB  the estimates  reported  in  Tables  2  and 3, finding that there are no substantial 
differences (see Appendix). 
We then focus on displaced workers. We know the month and the year in which a firm has 
been closed or suspended and the exact date in which a worker has been  displaced. In the sample of 
displaced workers we include only the workers separating from their firm in the same  month the firm 
has closed or suspended or in the two previous months.
12 
To identify the firm size effect we exploit the change s between post-displacement and pre-
displacement earnings  occurring for workers moving between firms of different size.  Given the 
characteristics of our dataset, we focus on displaced workers who subsequently find a new job  in a 
private firm, so we do not consider individuals  who remained unemployed, or  who became  self-
employed, public employees or agriculture employees.  To avoid spurious wages changes, we  also 
exclude from the estimates the observations referring to the year of displacement.  
We end up with a sample of about 6,500 displaced workers, including 25,000 observations. 
                                                       
11 Defined as firms with activity temporarily suspended (without employees) with intention to hire somebody 
again in the future. 
12 Firms who are going to close typically do not dismiss all their workers contemporaneously at the moment of 
closure. As a robustness check, we have also experimented considering as displaced (a) the workers separated 
from their firm in the same month of the closure or (b) leaving their job 6 months before the closure of the firm. 
In both cases, using these alternative samples we obtain very similar results to those shown in Table 5.   11 
Estimates of equation [1] in several specifications are reported in Table 5. In Panel (A) we 
show the estimates considering the five firm size categories while in Panel (B) we use as explanatory 
variable the firm size (in log) in continuous form. In column (1) we estimate a basic specification 
without controls, while in column (2) we include individual controls. Individual fixed effects estimates 
are reported in column (3).  
Along the different specifications, the estimates on the sample of exogenous job changes are 
not very different  from  the  estimates on the whole sample.  Fixed effects estimates show that a 
displaced worker earns a wage of 5.2 percent higher in a firm with 20-199 employees (with respect to 
a firm with 1-9 employees), while the wage is  13 percent higher in a firm with more than 1 ,000 
employees. Firm size wage differentials are  always highly significant. As regards the elasticity of 
wages to firm size (Panel B) we find a figure of about 2.7% controlling for individual characteristics, 
while it becomes 2.1% when we estimate using individual fixed effects (significant at the 1 percent 
level). It is worthwhile to note that if the large firm premium was exclusively due to the sorting of 
workers, we should find no significant coefficients on firm size. 
In columns (4)-(6) we further restrict our sample focusing only on workers employed for at 
least two years in a firm that eventually closed, and for at least two years in a new firm. Results are 
very similar. 
In sum, workers displaced by the closure of small firms moving to large firms experience a 
wage gain, while workers fired by large firms and moving to smaller firms experience a wage loss. 
Comparing cross-sectional (columns 2 and 5) with individual fixed effects estimates (columns 
3 and 6) we confirm that individual heterogeneity is able to explain about 50 -60% of the firm-size 
wage differentials found in cross-sectional estimates. Therefore, unobservable individual traits explain 
only a fraction of the variations, but a considerable share can be attributed to true firm effects. 
It is interesting to note that since the estimates on the whole sample of workers are similar to 
the estimates obtained on the sample of displaced workers, the problem of endogenous job changes do 
not seem create relevant biases.   12 
Table  5.  Firm  Size  Effects  on  the  sample  of  workers  displaced  by  firm  closure s.  Fondazione 
Debenedetti – 1997-2002. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 






             
      Panel A       
             
             
Firm Size 10-19  0.0863***  0.0687***  0.0376***  0.0791***  0.0674***  0.0340*** 
  (0.0099)  (0.0087)  (0.0072)  (0.0113)  (0.0101)  (0.0099) 
Firm Size 20-199  0.1369***  0.0971***  0.0520***  0.1391***  0.0983***  0.0558*** 
  (0.0102)  (0.0089)  (0.0084)  (0.0117)  (0.0103)  (0.0113) 
Firm Size 200-999  0.2743***  0.1662***  0.0721***  0.3007***  0.1798***  0.0579*** 
  (0.0177)  (0.0136)  (0.0123)  (0.0184)  (0.0147)  (0.0179) 
Firm Size >=1000  0.2277***  0.1355***  0.1303***  0.2538***  0.1274***  0.0923*** 
  (0.0193)  (0.0169)  (0.0155)  (0.0216)  (0.0187)  (0.0193) 
Observations  25852  25840  25840  15744  15740  15740 
R-squared  0.0432  0.3233  0.0630  0.0511  0.3255  0.0471 
Number of Individuals      6558      6208 
Controls  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
             
      Panel B       
             
             
Log (Firm Size)  0.0433***  0.0272***  0.0211***  0.0472***  0.0279***  0.0203*** 
  (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0022)  (0.0025)  (0.0022)  (0.0032) 
Observations  25367  25356  25356  15484  15480  15480 
R-squared  0.0457  0.3209  0.0648  0.0544  0.3250  0.0503 
Number of Individuals      6543      6162 
Controls  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Notes: The Table reports OLS estimates. In all the regressions we control for 6 year and 10 industry dummies (not reported). 
In columns (4)-(6) we focus on a two-year window around displacement. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
adjusted for clustering at the individual level, are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 




Asymmetric Effects of Firm Size Variations 
As  a  further  check  that  workers’  movements  across  firms  are  not  endogenous  when  considering 
displaced workers, we measure the impact on wages of firm size variations distinguishing between 
positive and negative variations of firm size. 
To this aim, we build a variable to capture positive variations of firm size as:  
 
      0 ,   ln max   ln it it Size Firm Size Firm   
  
which takes positive values for movements of em ployees towards larger firms (and zero for 
movements towards smaller firms or towards firms with equal size). 
Similarly, we define:  
 
      0 ,   ln min   ln it it Size Firm Size Firm   
    13 
which takes negative values for movements of employees towards smaller firms (and zero for 
movements towards larger firms or towards firms with equal size).
13 
Then, we estimate: 
   
   
 
it it it it it it v F X Size Firm Size Firm W          
        ln   ln ln 2 1   [2] 
             In Table 6 we report the OLS estimates of equation [2] on the sample of displaced workers, 
first without controls (column 1) and then with   individual controls (column 2).  Time invariant 
individual components are removed by taking differences. 
Considering the specification with a full set of controls (column 2), we show that the elasticity 
of wages to firm size is 1.82% when the worker moves  towards a larger firm, while the worker 
experience a  loss of about  2.24% when he moves  to a smaller firm.  Both these effects are highly 
statistically significant. We test if the magnitude of the wage variations are equal and we are not able 
to reject the null hypothesis of equality (p-value= 0.289). 
 
Table 6. Asymmetric Effects of Firm Size Variations. Sample of displaced workers.  
OLS estimates. Dependent Variable:    Wage ln   
  (1)  (2) 
  0 ln   FirmSize   0.0232***  0.0182*** 
  (0.0025)  (0.0025) 
  0 ln   FirmSize   0.0287***  0.0224*** 
  (0.0033)  (0.0033) 
Controls  NO  YES 
Observations  25367  25356 
R-squared  0.018  0.056 
p-value   0.243  0.304 
Notes: The Table reports OLS estimates. Individual controls are those used in column 2 of Table 2 with 6 
year dummies and 10 industry dummies. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for 
clustering at the individual level, are reported in parentheses. The symbols *** indicates that coefficients 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Source: Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti dataset (1997-
2002). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have investigated the extent and the determinants of firm size wage differentials in the Italian 
labor markets using two large datasets based on administrative sources.  
We firstly estimate a standard model controlling for individual characteristics finding that 
employees of large firms earn a wage 27% higher than small firm employees. Using individual fixed 
effects to take into account unobservable worker characteristics, we find that large firms pay about  
13% more than smaller firms or that the wage increases of about 2% when the size of the firm doubles. 
Comparing estimates in pooled models with fixed effects estimates, we show that about one-half of the 
observed  firm  size  wage  differentials  in  pooled  data  with  individual  controls  are  not  caused  by 
unobserved individual abilities but are true firm size effects. 
                                                       
13 For a similar approach in another context see Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997).   14 
Our findings are in line with the estimates of Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) finding for 
Swiss labor markets more or less the same shares attributable to unmeasured individual abilities and to 
firm size effects. On the other hand, our results are in contrast to Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 
(1999) who attribute almost the whole firm size effect to unobserved individual characteristics. 
Since with individual fixed effects we identify the wage differentials between large and small 
firms from workers moving between firms and since moving workers could be a self-selected sample 
giving rise to  inconsistent estimates, in the second part of the paper we focus on a sample of workers 
displaced because of the closure of their firms.   We exploit a unique characteristic of the FRDB 
dataset, containing information on whether a firm is active or has been closed. 
Replicating our estimation strategies  on this sample, we substantially confirm  the findings 
obtained on the whole sample: individual unmeasured abilities explain about one-half of the firm size 
wage premium, whereas the other half can be ascribed to firm size characteristics. 
Unfortunately, in our datasets we do not observe some relevant firm characteristics (such as 
profits and capital intensity) and we are not able to relate the wage premium due to firm heterogeneity 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Firm Size effects Fondazione Debenedetti. All Sample 1997-2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
    Panel A   
       
Firm Size 10-19  0.0756***  0.0455***  0.0140*** 
  (0.0027)  (0.0023)  (0.0019) 
Firm Size 20-199  0.1585***  0.0880***  0.0189*** 
  (0.0025)  (0.0021)  (0.0021) 
Firm Size 200-999  0.2994***  0.1703***  0.0388*** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0027)  (0.0025) 
Firm Size >=1000  0.4371***  0.2587***  0.0543*** 
  (0.0031)  (0.0027)  (0.0027) 
Observations  660874  660362  660362 
R-squared  0.1013  0.4393  0.0511 
Number of Individuals      170384 
Controls  NO  YES  YES 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES 
     
Panel B 
 
       
  Daily Wage (log)  Daily Wage (log)  Daily Wage (log) 
log(Firm Size)  0.0681***  0.0426***  0.0166*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0007) 
Observations  638015  637515  637515 
R-squared  0.1297  0.4444  0.0546 
Number of Individuals        168897 
Controls  NO  YES  YES 
Individual Fixed Effects  NO  NO  YES 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Daily Wage (log). The Table reports OLS estimates. In all the regressions we control for 6 year 
and 10 industry dummies (not reported). Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and adjusted for clustering at the 
individual level, are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, 
respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Source: Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti dataset (1997-2002). 
 